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NIX v. WILLIAMS: THE INEVITABLE DISCOVERY EXCEPTION
TO THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE
In Nix v. Williams,1 the Supreme Court created an "inevitable discov-
ery" exception to the exclusionary rule.2 This exception allows the prose-
cution to introduce illegally obtained evidence at trial upon a showing
that such evidence would inevitably have been obtained, even without the
police misconduct.3 The Supreme Court rejected the imposition of a sec-
ond prong on the inevitable discovery exception which would have re-
quired the government to prove the absence of bad faith.4 The purpose of
the inevitable discovery exception is to prevent the "setting aside [of]
convictions that would have been obtained without police misconduct.
5
The Court's inquiry in Nix includes a perfunctory balancing of the cost
to society of excluding the illegally obtained evidence against the deter-
rent effect that the suppression of evidence will have on police miscon-
duct.' This comment assesses the parameters of the inevitable discovery
exception created in Nix v. Williams, including its practical implications
and its potential impact on the continuing viability of the exclusionary
rule as a remedy for constitutional violations.
1. 104 S. Ct. 2501 (1984).
2. The exclusionary rule prohibits the use at trial of any evidence obtained in violation of
the United States Constitution. It is generally recognized as a judicially created remedy
designed to safeguard fourth amendment rights. United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338,
348 (1974). However, the rule has been extended to apply to fifth and sixth amendment
violations as well. See, e.g., United States v. Henry, 447 U.S. 264. (1980); Brewer v. Williams,
430 U.S. 387 (1977); Massiah v. United States, 337 U.S. 201 (1974). Inevitable discovery is
one of several exceptions to the exclusionary rule recognized by the Supreme Court. See
generally United States v. Leon, 104 S. Ct. 3405 (1984) (creating a good faith exception
where the police act within the scope of an invalid warrant issued by magistrate); Note,
Should "Good Faith" be an Element of the Inevitable Discovery Exception to the Exclu-
sionary Rule, 17 CREIGHTON L. Rlv. 1123, 1131-33 (1984) (listing other exceptions to the
exclusionary rule, including the attenuation doctrine and the independent source doctrine).
3. See Nix, 104 S. Ct. at 2511-12.
4. Williams v. Nix, 700 F.2d 1164, 1169 n.5 (9th Cir. 1983), rev'd, 104 S. Ct. 2501, 2510
(1984) (the Supreme Court held that an officer's objective good or bad faith is legally irrele-
vant under the inevitable discovery exception).
5. Nix, 104 S. Ct. at 2509 n.43 (stating that the purpose of inevitable discovery is similar
to the harmless error rule).
6. Id. at 2510; see also W. LAFAvE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH
AMENDMENT § 11.4(a), at 614 (1978) (The obvious competing consideration is that excluding
evidence thwarts society's interest in convicting the guilty.). See generally Kamisar, Does
(Did) (Should) the Exclusionary Rule Rest on a "Principled Basis" Rather Than an "Em-
pirical Proposition"?, 16 CREIGHTON L. REv. 565 (1983); Oaks, Studying the Exclusionary
Rule in Search and Seizure, 37 U. CHL L. REv. 665 (1970).
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I. THE CASE OF Nix v. Williams
On Christmas Eve, 1968, ten-year old Pamela Powers disappeared from
a YMCA building in Des Moines, Iowa, where she had accompanied her
parents to watch a wrestling tournament.7 Shortly after her disappear-
ance, Robert Anthony Williams, a resident of the YMCA, was seen leav-
ing the building with a large bundle wrapped in a blanket.8 A young boy
who had helped Williams open his car door reported that he had seen
"two legs in it and they were skinny and white."9
On December 26, 1968, Henry McKnight, a Des Moines attorney in-
formed the Des Moines police department that he had just received a
telephone call from Williams and that he had advised Williams to turn
himself in to the Davenport, Iowa, police.1" Williams then surrendered
himself.1 Detective Leaming and another police officer agreed to drive to
Davenport and pick Williams up, and they promised McKnight that they
would not question Williams during the return trip. 2 Before leaving Dav-
enport, Williams was arraigned before a judge on the outstanding arrest
warrant and advised of. his Miranda rights.'3 While still in Davenport,
Williams conferred with another lawyer, a Mr. Kelly, who advised him
not to say anything before consulting with McKnight in Des Moines.14
Having been denied permission to ride in the police car back to Des
Moines, Mr. Kelly reminded Learning not to interrogate Williams. 5
During the drive from Davenport to Des Moines, Williams never
waived his sixth amendment right to have an attorney present during po-
lice interrogation. 6 Shortly after leaving for Des Moines, Detective Leam-
ing began conversing with Williams and delivered the now famous "Chris-
tian burial speech."' 7 The speech was an appeal to Williams to assist
7. State v. Williams, 182 N.W.2d 396, 399 (Iowa 1970).
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 390 (1977) (also referred to as Williams 1).
11. Id.
12. Id. at 391.
13. Id.; see also Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
14. Brewer, 430 U.S. at 391.
15. Id. at 392 (Learning expressed some reservations about their agreement not to interro-
gate Williams, but Kelly firmly insisted that the agreement be carried out).
16. "At no time during the trip did Williams express a willingness to be interrogated in
the absence of an attorney. Instead, he stated several times that '[w]hen I get to Des Moines
and see Mr. McKnight, I am going to tell you the whole story'." Id.
17. Detective Leaming, began a conversation with Williams, saying.
I want to give you something to think about while we're traveling down the road
.... They are predicting several inches of snow for tonight, and I feel that you
yourself are the only person that knows where this little girl's body is ... and if you
get a snow on top of it you yourself may be unable to find it. And since we will be
going right past the area [where the body is] on the way into Des Moines, I feel that
we could stop and locate the body, that the parents of this little girl should be enti-
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them in locating the body of young Pamela Powers so that she could be
given a decent "Christian" burial.18 Williams told the officers where cer-
tain articles of clothing and the blanket could be found. When these
items could not be located, Williams led the officers to a culvert where he
had hidden the body.19 The body was found and Williams was subse-
quently indicted for first-degree murder."
The Iowa trial court overruled Williams' motion to suppress all evi-
dence connected with the statements he made to the police officers en
route to Des Moines. 21 Williams was convicted of murder and sentenced
to life imprisonment.2 2 On appeal, the Iowa Supreme Court affirmed with
four justices dissenting.2 3 Williams then filed a writ of habeas corpus in
the United States District Court. The district court found that the state
court's admission of Williams' incriminating statements to the police vio-
lated his fifth and sixth amendment rights.24 On appeal, both the Eighth
Circuit and Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the admission of the
incriminating statements violated Williams' constitutional rights.2 5 The
Supreme Court, however, explained in a footnote that while the state-
ments themselves were not admissible, the evidence obtained as a result
of the statements might be admissible upon a showing that it would have
been discovered regardless of Williams' incriminating statements.26
The state of Iowa then initiated a new trial, and Williams was again
convicted of first-degree murder. On appeal, the Iowa Supreme Court af-
firmed by applying an "inevitable discovery" exception to the exclusion-
tied to a Christian burial for the little girl who was snatched away from them on
Christmas [E]ve and murdered .... [A]fter a snow storm [we may not be] able to
find it at all.
Nix, 104 S. Ct. at 2505.
18. Id. See generally Kamisar, Brewer v. Williams-A Hard Look at a Discomforting
Record, 66 GEO. L.J. 209, 215-33 (1977) (noting factual discrepancies in the record).
19. Nix, 104 S. Ct. at 2505. Before leading the police officers to the body, Williams stated
several times that he would tell them the whole story after he had spoken with his attorney
in Des Moines. Brewer, 430 U.S. at 392.
20. Nix, 104 S. Ct. at 2505
21. State v. Williams, 182 N.W.2d 396, 402 (Iowa 1970).
22. Id. at 398.
23. Id. at 406. The dissenting opinion was unable to agree that Williams knowingly and
intelligently waived his constitutional rights. Id. at 408 (Stuart, J., dissenting).
24. Williams v. Brewer, 375 F. Supp. 170 (S.D. Iowa 1974), aff'd, 509 F.2d 227 (8th Cir.
1975), aff'd, 430 U.S. 387 (1977).
25. Williams v. Brewer, 509 F.2d 227, 228 (8th Cir. 1975), aff'd, 430 U.S. 387, 406 (1977).
26. While neither Williams' incriminating statements themselves nor any testimony
describing his having led the police to the victim's body can constitutionally be ad-
mitted into evidence, evidence of where the body was found and of its condition
might well be admissible on the theory that the body would have been discovered in
any event, even had incriminating statements not been elicited from Williams.
Brewer, 430 U.S. at 407 n.12.
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ary rule. Under this exception, the derivative evidence2 s was admissible
where: (1) the police did not act in bad faith and (2) even absent any
police misconduct, the evidence would inevitably have been discovered.29
Williams then filed a writ of habeas corpus in the United States District
Court which was denied.30 Without deciding the substantive validity of
the inevitable discovery exception, the Eighth Circuit reversed and re-
manded the case to the district court with directions to issue the writ of
habeas corpus.3 1 The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to
determine whether "evidence pertaining to the discovery and condition of
the victim's body was properly admitted on the ground that it would ulti-
mately or inevitably have been discovered even if no violation of any con-
stitutional or statutory provision had taken place."32
Upon review, the Supreme Court reversed the Eighth Circuit, holding
that the physical evidence-the body and the articles of clothing-was
admissible under the inevitable discovery exception although Williams'
statements relating to this physical evidence were excluded. The Court
rejected the prerequisite that an absence of bad faith must be shown.33
To satisfy the Nix test for "inevitable discovery," the prosecution must
show by a preponderance of the evidence that if there had been no consti-
tutional violation, the information or items received into evidence would
"inevitably" have been discovered by the police.3 4 The Nix decision fo-
27. State v. Williams, 285 N.W.2d 248, 255 (Iowa 1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 921 (1980).
28. See infra notes 81-85 and accompanying text.
29. Williams, 285 N.W.2d at 262.
30. Williams v. Nix, 528 F. Supp. 664, 675 (S.D. Iowa 1981).
31. Our analysis of this case makes it unnecessary to decide whether to recognize the
inevitable-discovery or hypothetical-independent-source exception to the rule exclud-
ing evidence obtained in violation of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel. We as-
sume arguendo that there is such an exception and that the opinion of the Supreme
Court of Iowa in this case correctly states -the requirments for establishing it. The
exception as thus stated requires the State to prove two things: that the police did
not act in bad faith, and that the evidence would have been discovered in any event.
We hold that the State has not met the first requirement. It is therfore unnecessary
to decide whether the state courts' finding that the body would-have been discovered
anyway is fairly supported by the record. It is also unnecessary to decide whether the
State must prove the two elements of the exception by clear and convincing evidence,
as defendant argues, or by a preponderance of the evidence, as the state courts held.
Williams v. Nix, 700 F.2d 1164, 1169 (8th Cir. 1983) (footnote omitted).
32. Nix, 104 S. Ct. at 2504.
33. "The Court of Appeals concluded, without analysis, that if an absence of bad faith
requirement was not imposed, 'the temptation to risk deliberate violation of the Sixth
Amendment would be too great, and the deterrent effect of the fe]xclusionary [riule reduced
too far.' . . . We reject that view." Id. at 2510 (citation omitted).
34. Id. at 2510-11. It is unclear exactly what facts are relevant in determining inevitability
and whether varying degrees of inevitability will suffice. See Nix, 104 S. Ct. 2516 & n.8
(Stevens, J., concurring) (interpreting "inevitable" to mean "in the natural and probable
course of events.") See also Kamisar, supra note 18; Maguire, How to Unpoison the
Fruit-The Fourth Amendment and the Exclusionary Rule, 55 J. CRm. L. CRIMINOLOGY &
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cused solely on the admissibility of the "illegally" obtained derivative evi-
dence, expressly refusing to consider Williams' statements or the police
misconduct."5
II. ORIGIN AND DEVELOPMENT
A. The Exclusionary Rule
The exclusionary rule, created by the Supreme Court in Weeks v.
United States,'s ensures adequate enforcement of fourth amendment
rights incident to illegal searches and seizures by the federal govern-
ment.37 Under this rule, evidence secured through an illegal search and
seizure is not admissible at trial.3 8 In Wolf v. Colorado,39 the Supreme
Court held that the fourth amendment right to privacy is enforceable in
state courts under the fourteenth amendment due process clause, but the
Court also held that the exclusionary rule is not an essential part of the
fourth amendment. After Wolf, the states were free to fashion their own
remedies for fourth amendment violations.
This freedom led to inconsistent methods of enforcement among the
states, and a double standard of enforcement in the federal courts.4 0 In
order to resolve these irregularities among the states and to ensure ade-
quate protection against illegal searches and seizures, the Supreme Court,
in Mapp v. Ohio,41 held that the exclusionary rule was applicable to the
POLICE SCL 307, 313-17 (1964).
It should be noted that the application of the inevitable discovery exception necessarily
presupposes the existence of a constitutional violation.
35. See Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 407 n.12 (1977) (holding that admission of Wil-
liams' statements violated his sixth and fourteenth amendment rights, but noting that the
victim's body and related evidence might be admissible under the inevitable discovery the-
ory); see also Nix v. Williams, 104 S. Ct. at 2512 & n.7 (finding it unnecessary to decide
whether Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976), should be extended to bar federal habeas
corpus review of Williams' sixth amendment claim).
36. 232 U.S. 383 (1914), rev'd in part, Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206 (1960). But
see Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886) (emphasizing the need for the Court to
enforce constitutional rights).
37. The exclusionary rule is implicit in the fifth amendment. See Brown v. Illinois, 422
U.S. 590, 601 (1975).
38. Weeks, 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
39. 338 U.S. 25 (1949) (exclusion necessary-to deter arbitrary police conduct), overruled
in part, Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
40. In non-exclusionary States, federal officers, being, human, were by it invited to and
did, as our cases indicate, step across the street to the State's attorney with their
unconstitutionally seized evidence. Prosecution on the basis of that evidence was then
had in a state court in utter disregard of the enforceable Fourth Amendment. If the
fruits of an unconstitutional search had been inadmissible in both state and federal
courts, this inducement to evasion would have been sooner eliminated.
Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 658 (1961).
41. Id.
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states under the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment.4 2 The
majority opinion in Mapp advances four separate rationales to support
application of the exclusionary rule: first, is the fundamental nature of
the right to privacy and the need to protect this right;43 second, is the
"intimate relationship" between the fourth and fifth amendments; 44
third, is the "imperative of judicial integrity" which was presumed to be
threatened by a potential conspiracy between police and judges to utilize
illegally obtained evidence;45 and fourth, and perhaps most importantly,
is the deterrence of police misconduct.4 8
Aside from protecting the fundamental right to privacy, the Supreme
Court relied upon the deterrence of police misconduct as its primary ra-
tionale in supporting the application of the exclusionary rule to the
states.4 7 Some critics, however, believe that the rule should be abolished
altogether.48 These critics argue that the exclusion of evidence is an inef-
fective deterrent and is an unjustifiable rationale to support the exclu-
sionary rule.49 The deterrence rationale presupposes the desire of individ-
ual policemen to see the defendant convicted.50 If, however, the police are
42. See also Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 411 (1971) (Burger,
C.J., dissenting).
43. Mapp, 367 U.S. at 656.
44. Id. at 657 ("The philosophy of each Amendment and of each freedom is complimen-
tary to, although not dependent upon, that of the other in its sphere of influence-the very
least that together they assure in either sphere is that no man is to be convicted on uncon-
stitutional evidence:").
45. Id. at 659 ("The criminal goes free, if he must, but it is the law that sets him free.
Nothing can destroy a government more quickly than its failure to observe its own laws, or
worse, its disregard of the charter of its own existence."); see also id. at 661 (Black, J.,
concurring); Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 485 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting);
Schrock & Welsh, Up From Calandra: The Exclusionary Rule as a Constitutional Require-
ment, 59 MINN. L. REv. 251 (1974).
46. "[T]he purpose of the exclusionary rule 'is to deter-to compel respect for the consti-
tutional guaranty in the only effectively available way-by removing the incentive to disre-
gard it.'" Mapp, 367 U.S. at 656 (quoting Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 217 (1960));
see also United States v. Leon, 104 S. Ct. 3405, 3443 (1984) (Brennan, Marshall, JJ., dis-
senting) (purpose of exclusionary rule is to promote institutional compliance with the fourth
amendment by law enforcement agencies generally).
47. See Nix, 104 S. Ct. at 2508 ("The core rationale consistently advanced by this Court
for extending the [e]xclusionary [r]ule to evidence that is the fruit of unlawful police con-
duct has been that this admittedly drastic and socially costly course is needed to deter po-
lice from violations of constitutional and statutory protections."); see also Bivens v. Six
Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971) (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (citing Oaks, supra
note 6, at 667); Note, supra note 2, at 1129; Note, Utah's Alternative to the Exclusionary
Rule, 9 J. CONTEMP. L. 171, 176-77 & n. 37 (1938) [hereinafter cited as Utah's Alternative].
48. See Bivens, 403 U.S. at 420 (Burger, C.J., dissenting); Forbes, Fact and Comment:
Good Intentions, Bad Results, FORBES, Feb. 28, 1983, at 23 (exclusionary rule only benefits
criminal and lawyer).
49. See supra note 48; see also Note, supra note 2, at 1131 (listing six major criticisms of
the rule).
50. See Oaks, supra note 6, at 720-36.
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concerned only with the immediate arrest, then it is unlikely that their
conduct will be affected simply because certain evidence might later be
deemed inadmissible.
Courts weigh this need to deter the unlawful exercise of police discre-
tion against "[tihe enormous societal cost of excluding truth in the search
for truth in the administration of justice." 51 Ultimately, this balance may
include aquittals for otherwise guilty defendants since the prosecution is
crippled by a lack of admissible evidence.52 However, the courts often
overlook the essential benefit derived from a rigid application of the ex-
clusionary rule: it protects the constitutional rights of all citizens, the in-
nocent as well as those who may be found guilty after proper inquiry.5
Arguably, if the exclusionary rule prevents incarceration of only a few
innocent individuals, then the cost to society of releasing a few obviously
guilty individuals is greatly diminished. Although the current efficacy of
the exclusionary rule is open to debate, the Supreme Court continues to
focus on the deterrence rationale when applying the rule or one of its
exceptions.5
4
B. The Inevitable Discovery Exception
Although distinguishable, the "independent source" exception is, in
many ways, the precursor of the inevitable discovery exception. 55 The in-
dependent source doctrine allows the admission of evidence that has ac-
tually been discovered by means wholly independent of any constitutional
violation.5 1 In Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 7 government
agents obtained corporate records through an illegal search. The records
were deemed inadmissible at trial, and afterwards the government sub-
poenaed the records in order to have them reviewed by a grand jury. The
Supreme Court held that the illegally obtained evidence was inadmissible
for any purpose. The Court, however, explained in dictum that such evi-
dence might be admissible if knowledge of the evidence was gained from
51. Note, supra note 2, at 1139.
52. But see Nix, 104 S.Ct. at 3437 (Brennan, Marshall, JJ., dissenting) ("[tihe [fourth]
Amendment directly contemplates that some reliable and incriminating evidence will be lost
to the government; therefore, it is not the exclusionary rule, but the amendment itself that
has imposed this cost.").
53. Cf. Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391 (1963) (granting habeas relief to defendants convicted
solely on basis of coerced confessions). See generally Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976)
(limiting habeas review of fourth amendment exclusionary rule cases); United States v.
Janis, 428 U.S. 433 (1976) (refusing to extend the exclusionary rule to civil cases).
54. See, e.g., Nix, 104 S. Ct. at 2508-09.
55. W. LAFAvE, supra note 6, § 11.4, at 620-21; see generally Note, supra note 2, at 1131-
32.
56. Nix, 104 S. Ct. at 2509.
57. 251 U.S. 385 (1920).
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an independent source.58
The "independent source" doctrine applies where no causal connection
exists between the illegal act and the acquisition of the evidence in ques-
tion, since the evidence was obtained apart from the illegality. 59 In Wong
Sun v. United States,6 0 the Supreme Court ap plied this doctrine and held
that the connection between the petitioner's unlawful arrest and an un-
signed statement made several days after the petitioner had been released
on his own recognizance, was so attenuated that the unsigned statement
was not the fruit of the unlawful arrest and, therefore, it was properly
admitted in evidence.61
The inevitable discovery exception was first articulated by Judge
Learned Hand in Somer v. United States."5 In Somer, federal agents ille-
gaily entered defendant's apartment where he was operating a still. After
talking with the defendant's wife, the agents learned of the defendant's
whereabouts and subsequently arrested him.13 The trial court suppressed
the evidence seized pursuant to the arrest because of the "illegal taint";
the Second Circuit, however, reversed and remanded explaining that the
evidence might be admissible if the government could show that the evi-
dence would have been discovered regardless of the illegal conduct.'
The inevitable discovery exception applies where the causal connection
between the evidence and the illegal conduct cannot actually be severed
because the evidence is obtained as a result of the illegal conduct. Conse-
58. Id. at 392 (independent meant distinct from the illegal act). This notion of an "inde-
pendent source" exception to the exclusionary rule was extended in Nardone v. United
States, 308 U.S. 338, 341 (1939),where the Supreme Court noted that even evidence some-
how connected to the illegal act might be admissible if the connection between the illegality
and the evidence at trial has "become so attenuated as to dissipate the taint" of the illegal-
ity. See also Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963) (one confession was closely
related to the illegal entry by police and therefore inadmissible, but another confession was
admissible since it was sufficiently unrelated as to "purge the taint"). Not "all evidence is
'fruit of the poisonous tree' simply because it would not have come to light but for the
illegal actions of the police." Id. at 487-88.
59. Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S. 338 (1939).
60. 371 U.S. 471 (1963).
61. See id. (test for admissibility requires balancing of societal, judicial, and constitu-
tional interests); see also Mantel, The Inevitable Discovery Exception to the Exclusionary
Rule: What is Standing in the Way of Supreme Court Adoption, 16 SUFFOLK U.L. REv.
1043, 1052-53 (1982).
62. 138 F.2d 790 (2d Cir. 1943).
63. The agents seized sugar and alcohol found in defendant's car, but the evidence was
suppressed since it was the product of an unlawful search and seizure. Id. at 791-92.
64. The government had to show that:
[Q]uite independently of what Somer's wife told them, the officers would have gone
to the street, have waited for Somer and have arrested him, exactly as they did. If
they can satisfy the court of this, so that it appears that they did not need the infor-
mation, the seizure may have been lawful.
Id. at 792.
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quently, the actual causal connection and the actual constitutional viola-
tion become irrelevant once the hypothetical "would have" analysis is su-
perimposed. 5 This hypothetical analysis enables judicial hindsight,
supplemented in part by particular facts before a court, to control the
determination of admissibility.6 Accordingly, some commentators con-
tend that the inevitable discovery exception fails to provide for an ade-
quate assessment of the policy considerations underlying the exclusionary
rule.6 7
The inevitable discovery exception is usually applied where some illegal
police conduct occurs during an ongoing investigation which leads the po-
lice to evidence that investigators would have found through routine po-
lice procedure.6 8 Theoretically, the only effect of the illegal police conduct
is to accelerate the discovery of evidence. 9 Generally, "where the prose-
cution can show that the standard prevailing investigatory procedure of
the law enforcement agency involved would have led to the discovery of
the questioned evidence, the exception will be applied to prevent its
suppression." 70
In Nix v. Williams,71 the Supreme Court applied the inevitable discov-
ery exception to admit evidence obtained in violation of defendant's sixth
amendment right to counsel.7" Presumably this exception is applicable
whenever evidence is obtained in violation of any of the defendant's con-
stitutional rights.7 3 As of the Nix decision, every federal circuit court of
65. See Nix, 104 S. Ct. at 2515 (Stevens, J., concurring).
66. See generally Note, Inevitable Discovery: The Hypothetical Independent Source Ex-
ception to the Exclusionary Rule, 5 HoFsTRA L. REV. 137 (1976).
67. See, e.g., Novikoff, The Inevitable Discovery Exception to the Constitutional Exclu-
sionary Rules, 74 COLUm L. REv. 88, 91 (1974); cf. Note, supra note 66, at 156-66 (in limited
situations where the police have acted in good faith and the dangers of a "hypothetical
search" are minimized, the inevitable discovery exception can be applied successfully as an
exception to the exclusionary rule).
68. See Novikoff, supra note 67, at 91.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. 104 S. Ct. 2501 (1984).
72. In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public
trial, by an impartial jury of the state and district wherein the crime shall have been
committed, which district shall have been previously ascertained by law, and to be
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the wit-
nesses against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor,
and to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence.
U.S. CONST. amend. VI. See Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 406 (statements made by
Williams were obtained in violation of defendant's sixth and fourteenth amendment rights
and therefore were inadmissible). See generally Strickland v. Washington, 104 S. Ct. 3562
(1984) (discussing effective assistance of counsel).
73. In Nix the majority opinion recognizes the inevitable discover exception as an expan-
sion of the "independent source" exception that has been frequently applied to fourth and
fifth amendment violations. Nix, 104 S. Ct. at 2509, & 2508 n. 3. See also United States v.
Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967); Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201 (1964).
19851 361
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW
appeals considering the issue had endorsed the inevitable discovery
exception.7
4
III. THE SCOPE OF THE CURRENT INEVITABLE DISCOVERY ExcEPTION
A. The Burden of Proof
The prosecution must prove by a preponderance of the evidence 5 that
the illegally obtained evidence would inevitably have been obtained re-
gardless of the illegal conduct. The prosecution must first show that cer-
tain investigatory procedures were underway or would have been per-
formed; and second, that these procedures would have inevitably led to
the discovery of the illegally obtained evidence.76 Even where the defen-
dant proves a violation of his constitutional rights, the prosecution need
not prove good faith, or the absence of bad faith, since the officer's state
of mind is irrelevant.7
1
If the prosecution can establish "inevitability" under the hypothetical
"would have" inquiry, the defendant must then prove, by a preponder-
ance of the evidence, that discovery was not "inevitable." This potentially
insurmountable burden on the defendant7 8 allows illegally obtained evi-
dence to be admitted. It may also encourage police to ignore vital consti-
tutional protections.79 As a result, there may be an increased threat of
74. Nix, 104 S. Ct. at 2507 n.2 (listing the circuit court decisions that have adopted the
inevitable discovery exception).
75. See id. at 2509-10 n.5 (citing United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 178 n.14 (1974)
(preponderance standard required at suppression hearing); Lego v. Twomey, 404 U.S. 477
(1972) (prosecution must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that a confession sought
to be used at trial was voluntary); cf. Nix, 104 S. Ct. at 2517-18 (Brennan, Marshall, JJ.,
dissenting) (the burden of proof should require a clear and convincing standard where the
evidence has not actually been obtained from an independent source). See generally J.
HALL, SEARCH AND SEizuRE § 22:14, at 638 (1982 & Supp. 1984).
76. See LaCount & Girese, The "Inevitable Discovery" Rule, an Evolving Exception to
the Constitutional Exclusionary Rule, 40 ALB. L. REV. 483, 502 (1976); see also Note, supra
note 2, at 1134.
77. "Admission of the victim's body, if it would have been discovered anyway, means that
the trial in this case was not the product of an inquisitorial process; that process was un-
tainted by illegality. The good or bad faith of the Detective Leaning is therefore simply
irrelevant." Nix, 104 S. Ct. at 2515 (Stevens, J., concurring).
78. Defenant's burden of proof may be insurmountable, given: (1) the difficulty of proving
a negative hypothetical, i.e., that the evidence would not have been inevitably discovered;
(2) the presumption, absent contrary evidence, that police testimony is more credible than
defendant's testimony; (3) the admissibility need only be proved by a preponderance of the
evidence; and (4) the plaintiff's state of mind is irrelevant. See also J. HALL, supra note 75,
§§ 22:13- :14, at 637-38 n.20.
79. See supra notes 52-54 and accompanying text (discussing the deterrence rationale of
the exclusionary rule); cf. Kamisar, supra note 6, at 565 (purpose of exclusionary rule is not
to deter individual police misconduct, but to encourage institutional or "systemic" compli-
ance with the fourth amendment). But see Nix, 104 S. Ct. at 2510 ("[w]hen an officer is
aware that evidence will inevitably be discovered, he will try to avoid engaging in any ques-
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incarcerating innocent individuals.80
1. When is Discovery Inevitable?""
Although Nix purports to require a hypothetical inevitable discovery,
lesser standards, such as a high probability or a reasonable certainty of
discovery, may suffice.8 2 It is unclear whether a court should determine if
discovery was inevitable when the police misconduct occurred or when
the evidence was discovered. In all likelihood, the time of actual discovery
will control, 3 but in Nix, since both events occurred at approximately the
tionable practice").
80. Although Williams was found guilty of first-degree murder, his guilt was not
undisputed.
The defense conceded that Williams had left the YMCA with the little girl's body,
but claimed that someone else had killed her and placed her body in Williams's room
in the hope that suspicion would focus on him. Williams, the theory went, then pan-
icked, fled, and hid the body by the side of a road, until he came to his senses and
gave himself up two days later. The theory is not so far-fetched as it sounds. The
State contended that the murder was related to sexual abuse of the victim, and in
fact acid phosphatase, a component of semen, was found in her body. But no traces of
spermatozoa, living or dead, were found either in the body or on Pamela's clothing.
One inference that could be drawn is that the victim was attacked by a sterile male.
Williams is concededly not sterile. The State's witnesses suggested that sperm, ini-
tially present, had been destroyed by freezing, but this theory was arguably inconsis-
tent with the hypothesis, earlier urged and accepted in connection with the motion to
suppress, that extreme cold would preserve the body's condition, not change it. The
defense called experts who testified that freezing would not destroy sperm cells. In
addition, although pubic hairs said by an FBI expert to be "like" those of the defen-
dant were found on the victim's clothing, so were other pubic hairs concededly be-
longing neither to Williams nor to the victim.
Williams v. Nix, 700 F.2d 1164, 1168 (8th Cir. 1983).
81. Inevitable is defined as: "Incapable of being avoided; fortuitous; transcending the
power of human care, foresight, or exertion to avoid or prevent, and therefore suspending
legal relations so far as to excuse from the performance of contract obligations, or from
liability for consequent loss." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 698 (5th ed. 1979).
82. When Williams told the police where the body was located, two hundred volunteers
were searching the surrounding counties, but the search was discontinued once Williams
promised to lead the police to the body. When the search was discontinued, the searchers
were within two and one-half miles of the body, perhaps three to five hours away from
discovery. Although it is likely the searchers "would have" discovered the body, it was not
"inevitable." See Nix, 104 S. Ct. at 2511-12; see also Wayne v. United States, 318 F.2d 205
(D.C. Cir. 1963) (finding that the discovery of the body was inevitable since the coroner
would have to investigate, but not considering the possibility that someone could perma-
nently dispose of the body before it was legally discovered), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 860
(1963); People v. Soto, 55 Misc. 2d 219 (N.Y. Crim. Ct.), 285 N.Y.S.2d 166 (1967) (defen-
dant's confession was suppressed but the murder weapon left in mailbox was admitted since
it would inevitably have been turned over to police the next day). See also Nix, 104 S. Ct. at
2516 (Stevens, J., concurring) (the burden was on prosecution to show that "[iun the natural
and probable course of events, [the searchers] would have soon discovered the body") (em-
phasis added); J. HALL, supra note 75, § 22:14, at 638-40.
83. If no evidence is found, then the question of inevitability does not arise. Arguably, the
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same time, the distinction was insignificant.8 4
Nonetheless, timing may be a critical factor in the successful applica-
tion of the inevitable discovery exception. For example, in Nix, if the de-
fendant was arrested shortly after disposing of the body and before a
search party was organized, then the likelihood of discovery would have
been greatly reduced. Even if the police can show that an organized
search is routine and would have been conducted, it may still be difficult
to document the number of searchers that would have been employed or
the exact area that would have been searched. Factual considerations
unique to each case may lead a court to distinguish between degrees of
"inevitability" or to create guidelines for "inevitability" based on arbi-
trary factual distinctions.8 5 Until the Court provides a clearer definition
of "inevitable," all facts influencing the likelihood of the hypothetical dis-
covery will be relevant.8 6
2. The Distinction Between Primary and Derivative Evidence
"Primary" evidence flows immediately from the illegality, whereas,
"secondary" or derivative evidence is derived from illegally obtained evi-
dence.8 7 The Nix Court applied the inevitable discovery exception only to
secondary or derivative evidence. 8 This distinction, however, may not al-
ways be useful.8 9 For example, it is difficult to see how "primary" evi-
dence such as an illegally obtained confession would otherwise have been
discovered; conversely, in many fourth amendment cases, it is easier to
see how "primary" evidence flowing from the illegal entry or the illegal
time of the constitutional violation should control because the violation may indirectly lead
the police to the evidence. The violation allows the police to initiate additional searches,
after the violation has occurred, which may support the conclusion that the evidence would
have inevitably been discovered.
84. The search was halted when Williams promised to lead police to the body, therefore
upon actual discovery of the body the same degree of inevitability existed. Nix, 104 S. Ct. at
2512. But cf. United States v. Apker, 705 F.2d 293 (8th Cir. 1984) ("inevitable discovery"
depended on the validity of the search warrants and on the sequence of events), cert. de-
nied, 104 S. Ct. 996 (1984).
85. The Nix Court purports to reject both of these alternatives and avoids their trappings
by simply examining all of the circumstances and concluding that discovery would have
been "inevitable." The Court noted that "[i]nevitable discovery involves no speculative ele-
ments but focuses on demonstrated historical facts capable of ready verification or impeach-
ment ...." Nix, 104 S. Ct. at 2510 n.5. See Novikoff, supra note 67, at 101-03 (different
standards of inevitability applied in different situations).
86. Facts relating directly to violation of defendant's constitutional rights will not, how-
ever, be relevant. See infra note 89 and accompanying text.
87. See generally LaCount & Girese, supra note 76, at 506-09.
88. See Nix, 104 S. Ct. at 2509; see also Taylor v. Alabama, 457 U.S. 687, 694 (1982);
Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 406 n.12 (1977); Adler, The Return of the Christian Bur-
ial Case, 70 A.B.. J. 100 (1984).
89. See W. LAFAvE, supra note 6, § 11.4, at 622-24.
INEVITABLE DISCOVERY EXCEPTION
search might inevitably be discovered. In practice, this distinction be-
tween primary and derivative evidence can only add to the confusion sur-
rounding the application of the inevitable discovery exception. This dis-
tinction is important only where the plaintiff seeks to "purge the taint"
from the illegally obtained evidence, an objective that is irrelevant under
the inevitable discovery exception.9"
3. The "Blind Faith" Exception
In Nix, the Court indicated that, by its nature, the inevitable discovery
exception eliminates any threat of police misconduct.9 1 Furthermore, the
Court explained that there are significant disincentives to obtaining evi-
dence illegally which also lessen the likelihood that the inevitable discov-
ery exception will promote police misconduct. These disincentives include
the possibility of departmental discipline and civil liability.92 In practice,
however, civil remedies and departmental discipline are ineffective deter-
rents to police misconduct due to prosecutors' and jurors' reluctance to
confront or condemn officers of the law.
93
By relying on a theory of inevitable discovery, the Court ignores actual
police misconduct or constitutional violations and focuses on what might
have occurred.94 This exception allows the police to exercise discretion in
determining when to violate a suspect's constitutional rights-regardless
of the police's conduct, the evidence may be admitted because of the in-
evitable discovery exception. Many commentators agree that this failure
to distinguish intentional or bad faith violations undermines the rationale
of the exclusionary rule. 5 Where the inevitable discovery exception is ap-
plied, the defendants are without recourse no matter how egregious the
constitutional violation may have been since the degree of police miscon-
duct is irrelevant to the Court's determination of "inevitability."9
90. See supra note 72 and accompanying text; see also Wong Sun v. United States, 371
U.S. 471 (1963) (the "taint" may be removed from illegally obtained evidence by showing
that intervening factors severed the causal link between the illegality and the evidence; ar-
guably once the taint is purged from the illegal evidence, it should be admissible); cf. Duna-
way v. New York, 442 U.S. 200 (1979) (where the suspect was detained without probable
cause and the Miranda warnings were not sufficient to purge the taint from the illegally
obtained "voluntary" confession); Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590 (1975) (discussing
"taintedness" of confessions).
91. Nix, 104 S. Ct. at 2510; see also Williams v. Nix, 700 F.2d 1164 (8th Cir. 1983); State
v. Williams, 285 N.W.2d 248, 258 (Iowa 1979).
92. Nix, 104 S. Ct. at 2510.
93. See Utah's Alternative, supra note 47, at 179-81.
94. Nix, 104 S. Ct. at 2515.
95. See, e.g., Note, supra note 2, at 1135-36, 1140-42; Adler, supra note 88, at 102-03; see
also W. LAFAvE, supra note 6, § 11.4, at 623-24.
96. See generally Adler, supra note 88, at 103 (quoting David Crump, president of the
Legal Foundation of America) (the separate policy bases for a general good faith exception
and inevitable discovery are (1) an officer acting in good faith could not be deterred, and (2)
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B. The Rationale for Inevitable Discovery in Nix v. Williams
1. The Inherent Logic of Inevitable Discovery
In Nix the Court noted that the "[d]rastic and socially costly [exclu-
sionary rule] is needed to deter police from violations of constitutional
and statutory protections. '97 The majority opinion, however, focused on
the immediate effect of exclusion: to prevent the prosecution from being
in a better position than it would have been in if no illegality had tran-
spired."' The majority, thereby disregarded the underlying deterrence ra-
tionale of the exclusionary rule. 9 Similarly, the Court noted that the ad-
mission of "derivative" evidence serves the purpose of ensuring that the
prosecution is not put in a worse position simply because of an earlier
police error.100 Again, the Court avoided any discussion of the impact of
the inevitable discovery exception on the deterrence rationale, 01 and in-
stead offered the simple logic of an "inverse" exclusionary rule.0 2
The Court relied heavily on the rationale of the independent source
exception to justify its adoption of the inevitable discovery exception. 0 3
The two are logically and functionally similar, yet they differ in one key
irrespective of the showing of good faith or bad faith, if the alleged constitutional violation
was not the cause of discovery, i.e., discovery was inevitable, then suppression is not justi-
fied); cf. United States v. Leon, 104 S. Ct. 3405, 3421 (1984) (stating that "[s]uppression
therefore remains an appropriate remedy if the magistrate or judge in issuing a warrant was
misled by information in an affidavit that the afflant knew was false or would have known
was false except for his reckless disregard of the truth.") (citing Franks v. Delaware, 438
U.S. 154 (1978)).
97. Nix, 104 S. Ct. at 2508.
98. Id. at 2509.
99. See supra notes 88-90 and accompanying text.
100. Nix, 104 S. Ct. at 2509.
101. The majority opinion implied that inevitable discovery will not undermine the deter-
rence rationale. The Court explained:
A police officer who is faced with the opportunity to obtain evidence illegally will
rarely, if ever, be in a position to calculate whether the evidence sought would inevi-
tably be discovered. On the other hand, when an officer is aware that the evidence
will inevitably be discovered, he will try to avoid engaging in any questionable
practice.
Id. at 2510. The Court also refused to recognize a separate sixth amendment justification for
exclusion since the evidence was reliable and subject to cross-examination. Id. at 2510-11.
102. Illegally obtained evidence is to be excluded, and legally obtained evidence is admis-
sible. The Court applied inevitable discovery in order to deem the evidence "legally ob-
tained," instead of reconciling the admission of illegally obtained evidence with justifica-
tions for exclusion.
If the prosecution can establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the informa-
tion ultimately or inevitably would have been discovered by lawful means-here the
volunteers' search-then the deterrence rationale has so little basis that the evidence
should be received. Anything less would reject logic, experience, and common sense.
Id. at 2509 (emphasis added).
103. Id.
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respect: under inevitable discovery, the evidence in question "has not ac-
tually been obtained from an independent source, but rather would have
been discovered as a matter of course if independent investigations were
allowed to proceed.110 4 In Nix, the logical appeal of the inevitable discov-
ery exception is magnified by the unusually tragic nature of the crime and
the apparent guilt of the defendant."0 5 The circumstances of Nix enabled
the Supreme Court to effect a balancing test solely for the purpose of
validating the inevitable discovery exception.
2. A Balancing of Values to Support Admissibility
The Nix decision feigned a balancing test to substantiate its theory of
inevitable discovery. 10 6 While the majority opinion emphasized the need
to balance society's interest in deterring unlawful police conduct with the
public's interest in having juries receive all probative evidence of a
crime, 0 7 the Court failed to consider how the inevitable discovery excep-
tion may affect these interests. Instead, the Court merely explained that
inevitable discovery is the mechanism necessary to balance these compet-
ing interests. 0 8 It appears the Court began with the assumption that the
admission of inevitably discoverable evidence has no impact on the deter-
rence rationale of the exclusionary rule, even if that evidence was illegally
obtained.
The Supreme Court briefly examined possible sixth amendment justifi-
cations 0 9 for the exclusionary rule including the need to protect the in-
tegrity and fairness of a criminal trial. The Court determined, however,
that the illegal interrogation of the defendant did not make the derivative
evidence any less reliable, or the trial any less fair." 0 The majority con-
104. Id. at 2517 (Brennan, Marshall, JJ., dissenting).
105. See id. at 2513 (Stevens, J., concurring); see also, Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387,
415-17 (1977) (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
106. But see United States v. Leon, 104 S. Ct. 3430 (1984) (Brennan, Marshall, JJ., dis-
senting). The dissent described the majority's rationale for adopting a good faith exception
to the exclusionary rule as follows:
Thus, in this bit of judicial stagecraft, while the sets sometimes change, the actors
always have the same lines. Given this well-rehearsed pattern, one might have pre-
dicted with some assurance how the present case would unfold. First there is the
ritual incantation of the "substantial social costs" exacted by the exclusionary rule,
followed by the virtually foreordained conclusion that, given the marginal benefits,
application of the rule in the circumstances of these cases is not warranted. Upon
analysis, however, such a result cannot be justified even on the Court's own terms.
Id. at 3441.
107. Nix, 104 S. Ct. at 2509-11.
108. Id. at 2509 & n.4 (stating that the interests of society "are properly balanced by
putting the police in the same, not a worse position than they would have been in if no
police error or misconduct had occurred.") (emphasis original) (citations omitted).
109. Nix, 104 S. Ct. at 2511.
110. Id.
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cluded that the inevitable discovery exception ensures fairness "by plac-
ing the State and the accused in the same positions they would have been
in had the impermissible conduct not taken place.""' Again, the Court
emphasized the immediate effects of admitting "relevant and undoubted
truth"1 2 without regard to the potential for police misconduct and un-
checked constitutional violations.
3. Deterrents Other Than the Exclusionary Rule
Nix suggests that the inevitable discovery exception is equipped with
built-in deterrents to combat the potential for police misconduct."' How-
ever, the effectiveness of such deterrents depends solely on the exercise of
individual police discretion. These deterrents necessarily presuppose that
police officers are unwilling to make an educated guess concerning the
applicability of the inevitable discovery exception in a given situation.
Furthermore, as noted by Justice Stevens, the potential cost of any litiga-
tion is, by itself, an adequate deterrent to police misconduct." 4 These
costs, however, are not borne by individual policemen and most incidents
of police misconduct rarely end in litigation." 5
Justice Stevens further noted that the prosecution's burden of proving
inevitability serves as an additional deterrent."' This conclusion, how-
ever, is questionable since the prosecution is allowed to use the evidence
it obtained in order to meet its burden.' While these "other deterrents"
are theoretically plausible, their tenuous bearing on actual police miscon-
duct probably renders them ineffective.
C. Inevitable Discovery and Virginia Law
The inevitable discovery exception created in Nix v. Williams will have
little, if any, impact on pre-existing Virginia law. The Virginia Supreme
Court appears to have already adopted the concept of inevitable discov-
ery in Warlick v. Commonwealth.1 8
111. Id.
112. Id. at 2510.
113. Id. at 2508.
114. Id. at 2517 (Stevens, J., concurring) (stating that the responsibility for that expendi-
ture [for litigation] lies not with the Constitution, but rather with the constable.").
115. Victims may be unwilling or unable to bring suit because of the inconvenience, the
cost, or because they are in jail; or perhaps because they seek to avoid the publicity.
116. Nix, 104 S. Ct. at 2516 (Stevens, J., concurring).
117. Id.
118. 215 Va. 263, 208 S.E.2d 746 (1974); see also Keeter v. Commonwealth, 222 Va. 134,
278 S.E.2d 841 (1981); cf. Hart v. Commonwealth, 221 Va. 283, 269 S.E.2d 806 (1980) (oral
confession inadmissible as product of an unlawful search and seizure of defendant's cloth-
ing); Reese v. Commonwealth, 220 Va. 1035, 265 S.E.2d 746 (1980) (confession properly ad-
mitted when not causally connected to illegal search). See generally R. BACIGAL, VIRGINIA
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In Warlick, the police recovered two vials of stolen drugs during an
illegal search of the defendant's home; later these drugs were suppressed.
After arresting the defendant and reading him the Miranda" warnings,
the police officer asked the defendant to disclose the hiding place of the
other stolen drugs. The defendant was unresponsive until the officer
asked him "[h]ow he would feel if some children got hold of the drugs.' 20
The defendant then led the officer to a field where the drugs were hidden.
In Warlick, the defendant failed to allege any sixth amendment viola-
tion, but claimed that all of the evidence should have been suppressed
because of the illegal search. The Virginia Supreme Court held that the
evidence obtained pursuant to the defendant's own statements was ad-
missible since the statements were made "freely and voluntarily" as a re-
sult of the defendant's humanitarian concerns and not as a result of being
confronted with the evidence by the police. The defendant's admission
that he had driven his father's car on the night of the break-in was also
admissible under the independent source doctrine because at trial a wit-
ness identified the defendent as the driver of the car involved; however,
the Virginia Supreme Court noted that this "evidence would have inevita-
bly been gained by the police without unlawful action on their part.' 12 1
Of course, the future of the inevitable discovery exception under Virginia
law will depend largely on what additional guidelines, if any, are provided
by Congress or the United States Supreme Court.
IV. THE FUTURE APPLICATION OF INEVITABLE DISCOVERY
The future application of the inevitable discovery exception depends
largely on the continuing viability of the exclusionary rule. In light of
recent Supreme Court decisions which curtail the scope of the exclusion-
ary rule,122 it has become increasingly difficult to determine when the ex-
clusion of evidence is proper. So far, the Supreme Court has been unwill-
ing to abandon the rule and Congress has failed to create a suitable
substitute.123 Although only Justices Marshall and Brennan find the rule
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 6-4, at 80 (1983); Comment, Evidence-Defendant's Confession Fol-
lowing Confrontation With Illegally Seized Evidence Not Excluded Where Independent
Motive Induced The Confession-WarHck v. Commonwealth, 9 U. RICH. L. REv. 767-72
(1975).
119. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
120, 215 Va. at 264-65, 208 S.E.2d at 747.
121. See id. at 268; 208 S.E.2d at 749. See also Annot., 43 A.L.R.3d 385, 398-406 (1972).
122. Immigration and Naturalization Serv. v. Lopez-Mendoza, 104 S. Ct. 3479 (1984) (ex-
clusionary rule does not apply in civil deportation hearing); see also United States v. Leon,
104 S. Ct. 3405 (1984) (creating good faith exception where officer relies on magistrate's
determination of probable cause); Segura v. United States, 104 S. Ct. 3308 (1984) (exclusion
of evidence not warranted because the lawful search was not invalidated by illegal entry).
123. The United States Senate passed a bill modifying the exclusionary rule to allow ad-
mission of evidence where the officer acted with a reasonable, good faith belief that he was
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constitutionally mandated, 2 4 a majority of the Court nonetheless recog-
nizes its validity as a method of deterring police misconduct. 25
The inevitable discovery exception is inconsistent with the deterrence
rationale of the exclusionary rule126 because it does not distinguish an of-
ficer's "bad faith" conduct from "good faith" conduct. For example, when
police have limited information concerning the commission of a crime,
they may be encouraged to violate a suspect's constitutional rights in or-
der to obtain additional evidence verifying the otherwise useless, limited
information. 2 7 This type of police conduct is especially likely where it
appears that the suspect will go free if no action is'taken. If officers of the
law are permitted to deliberately evade constitutional requirements, then
our judicial system is manifestly unjust. Evidence exclusion is currently
the only effective remedy recognized by the Court to curb police miscon-
duct; the inevitable discovery exception deprives an aggrieved defendant
of the use of this remedy.2 8
A. The Need for a Uniform Approach
The Supreme Court is continually redefining and reshaping the present
exclusionary rule." 9 On the one hand, the Court has emphasized the ima-
portance of deterring police misconduct and protecting individual rights,
such as privacy and the right to counsel, against the costs of exclusion
and the degree of actual infringement on individual rights. Conversely,
the Court has continued to create carefully delineated exceptions to the
exclusionary rule without regard for these declared concerns. The inevita-
ble discovery exception is one example of a technical and logically appeal-
ling exception.'" The Court's reliance on the hypothetical nature of inevi-
table discovery permits the Court to avoid reconciling the inevitable
discovery exception with the deterrence rationale of the exclusionary rule.
The inevitable discovery exception unnecessarily complicates litigation
by inviting hypothetical inquiry that may be substantiated by little more
acting in conformity with the fourth amendment. S. 1764, 98th Cong., 1st Sess (1984). See
generally Rader, Reforming the Exclusionary Rule, 31 FED. B. NEws & J. 250 (1984).
124. See United States v. Leon, 104 S. Ct. 3405, 3443 (1984) (Marshall, Brennan, JJ.,
dissenting).
125. Id. at 3421-22.
126. See generally Note, supra note 66, at 160.
127. But see Nix, 104 S. Ct. at 3445 (Brennan, Marshall, JJ., dissenting).
128. See supra note 47 and accompanying text.
129. See supra notes 52-53 and accompanying text.
130. See United States v. Place, 103 S. Ct. 2637 (1983) (emphasizing the value of a "total-
ity of the circumstances" test); United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544 (1980);
Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1978) (voluntariness of a consent to search is to
be determined from the totality of the circumstances). Compare Camara v. Municipal
Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967) with United States v. Leon, 104 S. Ct. 3405 (1984).
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than a police officer's own testimony.13' Although the uncertainty of the
"inevitability" standard may increase litigation, a rigid test for "inevita-
bility" may be equally undesirable. A static test which strictly defines
"inevitability" would stifle further judicial development of the exclusion-
ary rule.132 For instance, landmark decisions such as Brown v. Illinois"3
might never have been litigated, despite the constitutional violation, if it
could have been determined beforehand that the incriminating evidence
was inevitably discoverable.
In Brown, the defendant was arrested without probable cause and
questioned about a murder. After the defendant was given the Miranda
warnings, he made several incriminating statements to the police. The
Supreme Court refused to exclude the confessions solely because of the
illegal arrest and expressly declined to adopt a per se, or "but for,"
rule. 34 Instead, the Court emphasized the need to consider all relevant
factors bearing on the admissibility of the illegally obtained evidence.1
3 5
The police misconduct which may have caused the defendant to confess
was simply one of the considerations to be balanced. Similarly, the degree
of "inevitability" is but one factor that must be considered in light of the
costs of exclusion and the need to deter police misconduct.
3 6
B. Towards a "Totality of the Circumstances" Test
A single, all-inclusive inquiry would allow the Court to abandon its
string of exclusionary rule exceptions, and instead rely on express consti-
tutional guidelines to temper police misconduct. The Court could focus
on actual police misconduct in addition to "inevitability." The "totality
of the circumstances" test, used to determine probable cause,'1 7 may pro-
vide a suitable model. Both the exclusionary rule and the probable cause
requirement are regulatory and each aims to control law enforcement be-
havior-the probable cause requirement through a mandate to law en-
131. J. HALL, supra note 75, § 22:15, at 641.
132. See, e.g., Merten & Wasserstrom, The Good Faith Exception to the Exclusionary
Rule: Deregulating the Police and Derailing the Law, 70 GEo. L.J. 365, 371 (1981) (good
faith exception would choke off development of fourth amendment law).
133. 422 U.S. 590 (1975).
134. Id at 603; see also Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 487-88 (1963) (the
Court rejected the "but for" test concluding that not "all evidence is 'fruit of the poisonous
tree' simply because it would not have come to light but for the illegal actions of the
police").
135. These facts include statistical data regarding the costs of exclusion; the need to ad-
mit the evidence; the extent of the constitutional violation; and the degree of police miscon-
duct. See generally S. SCHLESINGER, EXCLUSIONARY INJusTIcmB THE PROBLEM OF ILLEGALLY
OBTAINED EVIDENCE (1977).
136. See Illinois v. Gates, 103 S. Ct. 2317 (1983) (replacing the two-pronged Aguillar-
Spinelli test for probable cause with a "totality of the circumstances" test).
137. Illinois v. Gates, 103 S. Ct. 2317 (1983).
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forcement officers, the exclusionary rule through a mandate to trial
courts. 8' A "totality of the circumstances test" would enhance judicial
development of the exclusionary rule and allow the Court to escape the
logical snares implicit in the inevitable discovery exception. 139
In Illinois v. Gates,14 0 the Supreme Court held that a "totality of cir-
cumstances" approach was appropriate for determination of probable
cause by a magistrate. In Gates, the Court explained that "probable cause
is a fluid concept-turning on the assessment of probabilities in particu-
lar factual contexts-not readily, or even usefully, reduced to a neat set of
legal rules. 1 4 1 A "totality of the circumstances" inquiry is also necessary
to fairly and consistently determine whether the exclusion of evidence is
an appropriate remedy for a particular constitutional violation. A "total-
ity of the circumstances" test is widely adaptable both to cases where
illegally obtained evidence might have been inevitably discovered and to
cases where the application of the exclusionary rule is an issue. Further-
more, the test provides the Court with an opportunity to honestly evalu-
ate all interests that are relative to questions of evidence exclusion.
V. CONCLUSION
The inevitable discovery exception undermines the existing bases for
the exclusionary rule largely because of the exception's failure to inhibit
intentional police misconduct. The inevitable discovery exception may, in
fact, encourage such misconduct. The actual benefits of inevitable discov-
ery are scarce, although the exception does provide an expedient means of
circumventing the exclusionary rule. It is too easy for hypothetical factual
distinctions, such as the time of discovery or the policeman's physical
proximity to the evidence, to control the determination of inevitability.
Until the Supreme Court adopts a "totality of the circumstances" test,
the inevitable discovery exception will operate as an "exclusionary loop-
hole" enabling the police to make full use of illegally obtained evidence
while allowing the Court to avoid discussion of vital constitutional protec-
tions, thereby retarding the growth of fourth amendment
jurisprudence. 42
Edward M. Macon
138. See Merten & Wasserstrom, supra note 132, at 391-93.
139. See supra notes 97-105 and accompanying text.
140. 103 S. Ct. 2317.
141. Id. at 2328.
142. The term "fourth amendment jurisprudence" as used here includes any study of the
application of the exclusionary rule. Although the exclusionary rule originated as a remedy
for fourth amendment violations, it has been readily extended to fifth and sixth amendment
violations as well. See supra note 2.
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